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The phrase “no child left behind” has become a familiar expression in American education circles and in popular cul-
ture. The sentiment implied by these four words is noble. However, the effects of the top-down implementation of the
high-stakes testing provisions of the law have been anything but salutary for public school children, teachers, and admin-
istrators. This claim is supported by data describing many of the ways in which well-intentioned but desperate educa-
tors, from the statehouse to the schoolhouse, have been driven to game the system in ironic defense of the children,
teachers, and administrators least equipped to defend themselves. It is argued herein that, instead of reauthorizing the
stronger accountability tenet of NCLB, it might do very well to let it fade away.  
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Introduction
I want to thank Secretary Spellings and her fine
team for welcoming me here to the Department
of Education. I have just reassured the Secretary
and the folks who work here that the reautho-
rization of the No Child Left Behind Act is a pri-
ority of this administration. And the reason I say
it's a priority is because this act is working. We
strongly believe in setting high standards for all
students, and we strongly believe that, in order
to make sure those standards are met, we must
measure to determine whether or not the
schools are functioning the way we expect them
to function, and the way the parents expect
them to function, and the way the taxpayers
expect them to function.
—President George W. Bush, NCLB
Reauthorization Speech, October 6, 2006
President Bush and other educational leaders believe that
setting high standards and holding students accountable
for meeting high standards are the foundation of educa-
tional reform. Attaching incentives to learning and sanc-
tions to poor performance is assumed to increase student
achievement by motivating students to learn more,
teachers to teach more effectively, and administrators to
implement better educational programs. According to
this line of logic, as written into the United States' No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) policy in existence since
2002, the best way to promote student learning and
achievement is to reward and penalize students, teach-
ers, administrators, schools, and school districts accord-
ing to student performance on standardized tests. 
Tests used to grant or deny high school diplomas,
also known as graduation or exit exams, are the most
common high-stakes accountability devices across states
For individual students, high test scores might bring
about college scholarships, exceptional academic
awards, or marks of distinguished achievement, while
low test scores may bring about retention in grade level
or the denial of a high school diploma. For teachers, high
test scores might bring about financial bonuses or
increases in salary, while low test scores may cause a
teacher to be fired or transferred to a different school. For
administrators, high test scores might warrant cash
bonuses and low test scores might result in administra-
tive transfers, contract termination, or job loss. For
schools and school districts, high test scores might merit
monetary awards and public approval, while low test
scores may bring about public criticism and school
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reconstitution or closure. Children attending low-per-
forming schools may also apply for transfer to another
public school with higher test scores, as written into
NCLB. 
But are the high standards and accountability com-
ponents written into NCLB in fact working as President
Bush suggests? Does the record show that raising aca-
demic standards and attaching serious consequences to
tests encourage students to learn and achieve more? 
Some researchers have provided evidence that high
standards and accountability have increased student
achievement (Braun, 2004; Carnoy & Loeb, 2002;
Rosenshine, 2003; Scheurich, Skrla, & Johnson, 2000;
Schiller & Muller, 2000), and others have provided evi-
dence refuting this claim. This second group of
researchers argues that states that have implemented
strong, standards-based accountability policies—regard-
less of their level of punitiveness—have advanced no far-
ther than states that have not implemented such meas-
ures (Amrein-Beardsley & Berliner, 2002b,c; Amrein-
Beardsley & Berliner, 2003; Camilli, 2000; Klein,
Hamilton, McCaffrey, & Stecher, 2000; Nichols &
Berliner, 2008; Nichols, Glass, & Berliner, 2005; Haney,
2000; Heubert & Hauser, 1999; Marchant & Paulson,
2005; Marchant, Paulson, & Shunk, 2006). In fact, these
researchers (see also Amrein-Beardsley & Berliner,
2002a; Haney, 2001) and others (Clarke, Haney, &
Madaus, 2000; Kohn, 2000; McNeil, 2000; Sacks, 1999)
suggest that, if anything, highly punitive accountability
strategies may be producing unintended negative conse-
quences, the gravity of which outweighs whatever bene-
fits these policies might promote. 
When former Texas governor Bush first ran for pres-
ident in 2000, he brought with him what he declared
was the proof that standards linked to accountability
mechanisms increase student learning and achievement.
In Texas, large gains in National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP) scores were heralded as
evidence that these policies did, undeniably, improve
student learning and achievement. Before these state
level policies were implemented, levels of student
achievement in Texas were far below the national aver-
age; after implementation, Texas children’s test scores
surpassed the rest of the nation (Grissmer, Flanagan,
Kawata, & Williamson, 2000). 
Graphs illustrating these phenomenal gains were cel-
ebrated, and the sensational claim was termed “the Texas
Miracle” (for more information, see Bracey, 2008; Haney
2000). Governor Bush’s high standards and accountabil-
ity policies apparently produced miraculous effects in
Texas and, he reasoned, would undoubtedly increase
performance of all schools throughout the nation. This is
how he justified his proposed education policies during
the presidential campaign of 2000, and he used these
claims to justify his aspiration to become known as the
Education President.
During this time, however, researchers who reexam-
ined these phenomenal gains in student achievement
(Amrein-Beardsley & Berliner, 2002c; Haney, 2000)
found that the gains in Texas weren’t all they were
cracked up to be. At the same time that children in Texas
posted amazing gains, the percent of students excluded
from participating in the NAEP increased at extraordi-
nary rates. Paradoxically, the nation’s exclusion rate (out-
side Texas) declined at the same time. 
Haney (2000) described this as an “illusion arising
from exclusion” because significantly more students with
disabilities and non-English speakers were excluded
from participating in the Texas NAEP. Whether the phe-
nomenal gains posted in Texas were a product of authen-
tic learning or should be attributed to fewer low-per-
forming students participating became the subject of a
fierce dispute, both scientific and political. This ultimate-
ly divided people into two camps: Those who still
believed a miracle had occurred in the Texas education
system and those who believed the miracle was more
mythical, contrived through inflated and selective stu-
dent exemption practices. Critical researchers continue
to question whether more testing increases student
achievement and whether reported test score increases
reflect improved student learning or multiple methods of
“gaming the system.”
Gaming the System
In The Prince, Machiavelli makes cunning recommenda-
tions to the prince so that he might game the system and
secure prince-hood, public support, control of the peo-
ple, and aristocratic power. Machiavelli’s tactical sugges-
tions to the prince include: justify human extermination,
eliminate public freedom, embrace opportunism,
destroy resistance, seduce the public, and mask evil with
good. He argued that extreme, cruel, deceitful, immoral,
and unethical measures are warranted and necessary to
pursue power, the ultimate end for the prince. 
Machiavelli was eventually tortured, imprisoned,
and exiled because of his brutally honest book that only
thinly disguised the disclosures of the inner workings of
politics in renaissance Italy. Yet Machiavelli continues to
help us understand how people game social systems for
personal benefit, power, and control. 
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People who game the system understand the rules,
policies, and procedures of the game and are equipped to
manipulate and take advantage of loopholes in the sys-
tem. In fact, gaming the system is easiest when rules,
policies, and procedures are imprecise and ambiguous,
permitting the game to continue. Unfortunately through
exploiting loopholes in these rules, educators may com-
promise higher values: honesty, integrity, and worthiness
of public trust, to name a few. In true Machiavellian
form, people who game the system compromise their
morals and ethics to achieve self-justified ends. 
Instances of gaming the system are widespread and
permeate all social-political systems. Some lawyers game
the system for their guilty clients by exploiting the insan-
ity plea. Some highly sought accountants are proficient at
gaming the system by finding or creating questionable
tax shelters, breaks, exemptions, deductions, and the
like. Enron is the paradigmatic case of gaming the system
in big business. What about those who game the system
by illegally downloading, justified as legally borrowing,
movie and music electronic files from strangers who
allegedly want to share their files via Limewire.com?
Others game the system by using radar detectors to
evade speeding tickets. Retailers game the system by
overpricing store items and then advertising them at 50
percent off the (artificially inflated) price. Physicians
game the system by overcharging insurance companies
for their services and justify their fraud because insur-
ance companies are simultaneously gaming the insured.
All social systems have players in the game, one way
or another, and the only way to control these players is
to close the loopholes perpetuating such gaming or elim-
inate the practices causing such gaming altogether. In
policy analysis, Machiavelli can help us better under-
stand the ways players game such policies (Radin, 2000).
Gaming the System to Meet NCLB’s 100%
Proficiency Target
NCLB requires all states to implement accountability
policies to ensure that 100 percent of elementary stu-
dents in grades 3–8 and high school students in public
schools achieve academic proficiency by the year 2014.
Every public school student in the nation is to reach aca-
demic proficiency eight years from now. Will 100 per-
cent of America’s public school students reach this target?
By gaming the system, it is likely. 
Teachers, administrators, and education leaders have
employed a multitude of questionable test preparation
practices to help their states, schools, and students meet
high standards. Methods of gaming tests, however, result
in spurious test score gains unrelated to true gains in stu-
dent learning. When investigating whether stronger
accountability measures help students meet higher stan-
dards, we must consider the extent to which the follow-
ing factors are used to artificially inflate gains in student
learning and academic achievement.
Teaching to the Test
Teaching to the test occurs when teachers disproportion-
ately teach students things they know will be on
accountability tests. A teacher who has administered a
few of these annual tests in the past may gain some
understanding of what to expect and teach students only
those concepts the teacher predicts will be on future iter-
ations of the test. A teacher may rehearse students for a
test with clone items that look exactly like the items on
previous forms of the test but with the names of the peo-
ple in the word problems and the numbers in the math-
ematical equations changed. A teacher may have stu-
dents write and rewrite five-paragraph essays, neglecting
other writing genres, knowing that a five-paragraph
essay is expected on the annual writing assessment. A
teacher may make copies of the actual test or the test
used in previous years to rehearse students for the
upcoming tests, over and over again. Teachers might
have their students spend hours memorizing facts, learn-
ing test-taking strategies, bubbling score sheets accurate-
ly, eliminating unlikely distractor responses, making
educated guesses, and using multiple-choice answers to
solve mathematical problems backwards, all of which
help students game these tests to pass; all of which are
classic threats to test validity. 
Because teaching to the test may cause scores to
increase, it is a popular practice in which teachers engage
to artificially raise test scores. Such practices are some-
times even encouraged by local school administrators
when school composite statistics are at risk. Score gains
do not last, however, nor are they reflected in other
measures of student learning and achievement (See, for
example, Amrein-Beardsley & Berliner, 2002b,c;
Heubert & Hauser, 1999; Linn, Graue, & Sanders, 1990;
McNeil, 2000; Stake, 2001).
Narrowing of the Curriculum
Narrowing the curriculum is when teachers do not teach
some important topics within subject areas or avoid
teaching parts of the state standards they are supposed to
teach, knowing that what they omit from their lessons
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will not be included on accountability tests. It may be
written in the state standards, for example, that a 10th
grade mathematics teacher must teach graphing equali-
ties and inequalities. A teacher aware of the fact that
questions assessing students’ abilities to graph inequali-
ties are usually not included on the high school gradua-
tion exam might simply omit this lesson to concentrate
more on graphing equalities instead. 
School administrators also contribute to this at the
local school level. Two months before high-stakes tests
are administered, a school principal may eliminate
recess, art, music, or physical education or replace sci-
ence with mathematics and social studies with language
arts to intensify math, reading, and writing instruction to
provide amplified opportunities for students to rehearse
the basic subject areas tested (See, for example, Dorn,
1998; Koretz, 1996; Kreitzer, Madaus, & Haney, 1989;
McNeil, 2000; Sacks, 1999; Swope & Miner, 2000.) 
Exclusion and Exemption Practices
Students are also subjected to creative exclusion and
exemption practices. Students with histories of poor aca-
demic performance might be encouraged to stay home
and miss accountability tests, or they might be suspend-
ed or expelled before accountability tests are adminis-
tered. Low-scoring high school students might be coun-
seled to quit or be suspended from school just before
tests so that their scores will not be included in compos-
ite test score calculations. Students may be falsely
exempted from participating in accountability tests for
being English language learners (ELLs) even if they speak
English fluently enough to participate. Additionally, stu-
dents may be purposely labeled as severely handicapped
when, by law, their handicap should not prevent them
from participating in state tests. (Federal and state provi-
sions have been enacted, however, to minimize these
false exemptions of ELLs and special needs students.)
Low-performing students may also be retained in grade
levels in excessive numbers before pivotal testing years
so that they will have more chances to be drilled on the
tested material or so that they will not taint the pool of
test takers by negatively skewing test score distributions.
School personnel would rather these students not take
part in accountability tests. In all probability, if these stu-
dents participated, they would bring down the school’s
average scores, placing the district, school, administra-
tors, and teachers at risk (See, for example, Bass, Dizon,
& Feller, 2006; Haladyna, Nolen, & Haas; 1991; Haney,
2000; Heubert & Hauser, 1999; Kelleher, 1999; Klein,
Hamilton, McCaffrey, & Stecher, 2000; Madaus &
Clarke, 2001; Madaus, West, Harmon, Lomax, & Viator,
1992; McGill-Franzen & Allington, 1993; McNeil, 2000;
May, 2000).
The Bubble Kids
School personnel have also refocused energies on bubble
students, also known as borderline students, who are on
the border of passing or failing high-stakes tests. Because
these students are more likely than their lower scoring
peers to post passing scores, school personnel often
focus inordinately and intensively on these students to
help them acquire the knowledge necessary to pass these
tests. Each passing score posted by a borderline student
translates into an increase in overall test averages and,
more importantly, student proficiency percentages.
Students above the borderline guarantee good scores, so
they are left alone; students below the borderline, for
whom school personnel have the least amount of hope,
go about the normal school day, neglected because they
are least likely to pass the tests or contribute to increased
averages and proficiency percentages (Kohn, 1999;
Madaus, West, Harmon, Lomax, & Viator, 1992;
McNeil, 2000; Schrag, 2000). 
Cheating
The pressures associated with stronger accountability
testing are also driving teachers and school administra-
tors to cheat. In fact, as tests become more consequential
and the penalties of failure more severe, the likelihood
school personnel will cheat on tests increases (Schrag,
2000; Viadero, 2000). In newspaper articles across the
country, journalists have described ways in which teach-
ers and administrators have cheated on accountability
tests; the articles written because they have been caught.
A teacher may allow students more time to complete a
test than is prescribed; walk around the classroom pro-
viding students with hints, clarifications, definitions, or
answers; tell students to rethink particular questions if
the teacher sees incorrect answers; and some have been
caught manually correcting students’ answers on
accountability test score sheets. Cheating is just one
more way teachers and administrators can artificially
promote increases in test scores to dodge the negative or
realize the positive consequences attached to accounta-
bility tests (Haladyna, Nolen, & Haas, 1991; Haney,
2000; Kornhaber & Orfield, 2001; Sacks, 1999;




Administrators are not immune to the temptations of
cheating and other score-boosting practices.
Administrators have briefed teachers on what will be
tested on upcoming accountability tests; made copies of
secure tests and distributed them to teachers before offi-
cial tests are administered; and changed low-scoring stu-
dents’ identification numbers to make their score sheets
invalid, resulting in the exclusion of their scores from the
school’s composite statistics. Administrators may hire
test-boosting consultants who encourage teachers to
focus instruction only on those students who they feel
have a fighting chance of passing accountability tests or
initiate mass exoduses of low-scoring students who will
do nothing for composite test reports but bring school
results down. Conversely, administrators might encour-
age students who have already posted high scores on
accountability tests to participate every year to boost
overall school averages. Administrators may use funds—
even entire textbook budgets—to purchase test prepara-
tion booklets filled with test practice worksheets guaran-
teed to boost test scores, provided that children are rig-
orously drilled on one test prep activity after another.
Administrators may also narrow the curriculum by con-
centrating all personnel efforts on the subject areas “that
matter,” after which significant gains in scores are cele-
brated, only to realize significant drops in achievement in
the neglected subject area(s) at the same time (See, for
example, Booher-Jennings, 2006; Gordon & Reese,
1997; Goodnough, 2001; Kohn, 2000; Madaus, West,
Harmon, Lomax, & Viator, 1992; McNeil, 2000; McNeil
& Valenzuela, 2001; Nichols, Glass, & Berliner, 2005;
Schrag, 2000; Smith, 1991).
Dumbing Down Tests and Manipulating Cut Scores
Almost always when state accountability tests are first
administered, extremely high rates of student failure are
published in state newspapers. The public is sent into a
frenzy, and politicians and the public usually blame
teachers, administrators, and low standards and expecta-
tions for the lack of student proficiency. In actuality,
however, the initial high rate of student failure can be
better explained by two factors: (1) How difficult and
unfamiliar the accountability test was, and (2) Where the
pass/fail cut score was set. Because it is not politically fea-
sible to fail too many students year after year, over time
accountability tests are made easier, cut scores are low-
ered, and more students pass. This gives the public the
false impression that, because of initial high failure rates,
the threat of accountability tests worked: the threat of
sanctions motivated students to learn more, teachers to
teach more effectively, and administrators to adopt better
educational programs. In actuality, what happens behind
the scenes in state departments of education and legisla-
tive committees often has a more significant role in gen-
erating apparent gains in student achievement. Dumbing
down tests and manipulating cut scores are two more
ways to manufacture increased levels of student profi-
ciency and politically acceptable pass rates (See, for
example, Haney, 2000; Kellow & Wilson, 2001; Koretz,
Linn, Dunbar, & Shepard, 1991; Madaus & Clarke,
2001; Orfield & Kornhaber, 2001; Rudner, 2001;
Schrag, 2000). 
A Case in Point
In 1996, Arizona State Board of Education members
decided to develop new, criterion-referenced competen-
cy tests in math, reading, and writing to hold children
accountable for meeting state standards in grades 3, 5, 8,
and 10. All students attending an Arizona public school
were to be assessed on the new Arizona Instrument to
Measure Standards (AIMS) tests. Students in grade 10
were required to take and pass all three subtests of the
grade 10 AIMS to receive a high school diploma. If stu-
dents did not pass the graduation test on their first
attempt, they could continue to take the subtest(s) they
did not pass until they met or exceeded the state stan-
dards in all three areas. They were permitted to retake
failed tests twice annually until age 22. 
After the tests were first administered in 1999, how-
ever, complaints arose that the tests were too difficult.
After students failed the AIMS at astonishing rates, par-
ticularly in math, state officials made the AIMS tests eas-
ier. In 2000, members of the Arizona Board decided to
remove all short-answer, constructed response items pre-
viously included on the math and reading AIMS tests—
the revised test would become 100 percent multiple
choice. They also removed more difficult items and
reduced the length of the math test. 
Complaints also arose that the some of the content
tested was invalid. For example, the 10th grade math test
included trigonometry problems, but trigonometry was
not taught until the 11th grade. How could Arizona’s stu-
dents be held accountable for knowing trigonometry that
they had not yet had the opportunity to learn? So the
state made the tests more valid through improving align-
ment with standard curricula, which consequently made
the tests easier again. At the same time, the state lowered
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the passing grade, or cut score, allowing more students
to pass the high school graduation exam. 
Initially, the class of 2001 was to be the first class to
either pass the AIMS high school graduation exam or be
denied high school diplomas. But implementation of this
provision was postponed for the class of 2002; in 2001,
implementation was officially pushed back again to first
take effect for the class of 2006.
However, after tens of thousands of students contin-
ued to struggle to pass the AIMS, educational leaders at
all levels began gaming the system and creating addition-
al loopholes to help students pass the tests, particularly
in anticipation of the high rates of student failure which
were predicted and the 100 percent proficiency target
written into NCLB (Kossan, 2006; Yara, 2006). 
State officials gave teachers better guidelines on what
to expect on the tests; rewrote state standards to indicate
which components of the state standards would or
would not be tested; and uploaded practice tests with
clone items onto the Arizona State Department of
Education Web site for teacher, parent, and student
access and practice. All of these mechanisms were pro-
vided with the good intentions of helping teachers teach
the standards and administrators align curricula more
effectively. But they were often, and continue to be, mis-
used as they enable many to teach to the test and narrow
the curriculum more efficiently and accurately.
In 2004 nine Arizona school districts were accused
of “engaging in illegal actions to help students appear to
have learned more than they had in actuality” on the
AIMS tests (Haver, 2004). In one case, a principal of a
school in one of the largest school districts in the
Phoenix metropolitan area had to defend herself before
the school board, pleading that she did not improperly
alter students’ test scores. She resigned and continues to
deny the allegations (Haver, 2004). Known instances of
cheating in Arizona are relatively minor, though, when
compared to reports of cheating in states with more dra-
matic and immediate consequences riding on students’
performance on high-stakes accountability tests
(Nichols, Glass, & Berliner, 2005). 
In 2005 the AIMS tests were altered again to assess
the new state standards adopted by the Arizona State
Board of Education in 2003 and to include criterion-ref-
erenced and norm-referenced test items. Because
Arizona state statute requires the state to administer cri-
terion-referenced and norm-referenced tests as part of its
state assessment program, state officials wisely commis-
sioned a new assessment to serve both purposes at once.
By including these test items in the revised AIMS tests,
they cut the time it took to administer the two state-man-
dated tests in half while continuing to provide the state
with the test data reports required by law. It was a win-
win situation. Nonetheless, it meant implementing yet
another version of the AIMS and establishing another set
of cut scores.
The AIMS Dual Purpose Assessment (DPA) was pre-
sented and approved by members of the Arizona Board
in 2005. The AIMS DPA, the test currently used in
Arizona, includes a combination of criterion-referenced
items taken from the AIMS and norm-referenced items
taken from the TerraNova, a nationally normed test cre-
ated by CTB/McGraw-Hill. The new tests were also
expanded to assess levels of student learning continuous-
ly in grades 3–8 and in high school. Likewise, new
benchmarks for meeting the state standards were set. As
expected, the second significant revision to the AIMS
tests caused marked increases in levels of student
achievement. 
When students in the class of 2006 first took the
AIMS test as sophomores in 2004, 39 percent passed the
mathematics AIMS, 59 percent passed the reading AIMS,
and 62 percent passed the writing AIMS. The public was
dismayed, and state officials and the public blamed
teachers and administrators for not doing their jobs and
blamed children and their families for not meeting the
higher standards adopted by the state. Some of these crit-
icisms may have had merit, but the poor levels of student
achievement could have probably been better explained
by the difficulty of the tests and the positioning of the cut
scores at the time.
In contrast, when students in the class of 2007 first
took the revised AIMS DPA as sophomores in 2005, 69
percent of the sophomores passed the math section (a 30
percent increase in one year); 75 percent passed reading
(a 16 percent increase in one year); and 74 percent
passed writing (a 12 percent increase in one year)
(Kossan, Ryman, & Konig, 2006). Miraculous gains in
achievement were reported, which were mostly—if not
entirely—due to the administration of the new and sig-
nificantly easier AIMS DPA. Nonetheless, educators,
members of the media, and politicians commended
teachers and administrators for doing their jobs so much
better and congratulated school children for taking their
learning and achievement more seriously. It is not that
these good things did not occur, but little mention was
made of the major alterations to the standards, the tests,
the cut scores, and the lowering of the bar.
One year later, to guarantee that still more Arizona
students would meet the higher standards set forth by
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the state, the Arizona school superintendent wrote that
he was going to make it his mission to help more stu-
dents pass the AIMS tests. He promised to do this by
ensuring that teachers, parents, and students knew what
was on the test, by developing and administering more
test-preparation workbooks, and by providing free tutor-
ing to students in need (Fisher, 2006). The latter option
represented the only educationally defensible test prepa-
ration practice (Popham, 2004) to increase student
learning. That is, if students were tutored on the stan-
dards and not only on test-taking tactics, content-focused
tutoring would be a legitimate way to increase student
learning. State legislators allocated $10 million to tutor
juniors and seniors who hadn't passed the test, and
6,000 of 37,000—or 16 percent—eligible students took
advantage of the program (Roberts, 2006).
One high school designed classes around AIMS to
help seniors past the test or particular portions they had
failed (Yara, 2006). These classes, titled AIMS Math,
AIMS Reading, and AIMS Content, were offered in Triage
Academies in which students rehearsed for the AIMS two
hours per day (Kossan, Ryman, & Konig, 2006). At
another school, an after-hours AIMS homework club was
developed to help high scorers earn college scholarships
and low scorers improve their chances of passing the
AIMS (Homework Clubs, 2006). At another school, stu-
dents were touted as students who “loved to write” as
evidenced by their mastery of the six traits of writing, a
rubric that happens to be the scoring guide used to
assess all student writing samples on the AIMS writing
test (Madrid, 2006). 
As Figure 1 illustrates, it is difficult to differentiate
between increased levels of student learning and system-
gaming influences to explain the dramatic jumps in test
scores because they immediately follow  state policy
measures to make the tests easier and lower passing
scores. It is also impossible to determine how other
methods of gaming the system applied in local school
settings further artificially increased levels of student
achievement throughout this period. Publicly available
data, downloaded from the Arizona Department of
Education Web site (http://www.ade.az.gov), represents
the percent of students who met or exceeded Arizona
state standards on the grade 3, 5, 8 and 10 math AIMS,
and they are presented here.
Figure 1 (page 13) illustrates points at which
accountability tests were made easier or cut scores were
lowered. But what is impossible to capture in these trend
lines are the cases in which teachers and administrators
may have gamed the system in more invisible, subtle, yet
significant ways previously discussed and too frequently
used to artificially boost students’ test scores. It is not
possible to capture phenomena like teaching to the test,
narrowing of the curriculum, instances of cheating (espe-
cially since cheating is under-reported), test coaching,
indefensible test preparation practices, test drills and
rehearsals, using clone items to prepare students for
tests, and student exemptions and expulsions. However,
we know such methods of gaming the system persist,
and we know they work to artificially boost student test
scores. These methods bloom when children, teachers,
administrators, schools, and districts are to be penalized
for poor or rewarded for solid test performance and
when consequences attached to student performance on
accountability tests become more consequential. 
For clarity, suggest changing to: In 2006 after last-
ditch efforts to postpone using the test as a graduation
requirement failed, the state of Arizona, in a final effort
to prevent a large number of students from failing the
AIMS test, allowed thousands of high school students to
apply bonus points from the grades they earned of C or
higher in core classes to trump their failing AIMS scores.
In 2006, of the 64,000 students who started the school
year as seniors (the first class to be held accountable for
their high-stakes test performance), 14,000-plus
dropped out or moved. Of the remaining 50,000 seniors,
46,111 (92.2 percent) passed AIMS; 2,630-plus (?5.3
percent) failed AIMS but passed using bonus points from
core classes; and 297 (0.6 percent) were denied a high
school diploma (Kossan, 2006). In the end, this was
quite a trivial number, especially given the complex,
aforementioned history and the overarching goals and
intentions of the policy.
When asking whether high-stakes tests help stu-
dents meet higher standards, we must take care to dis-
criminate between factors promoting authentic gains in
learning and achievement and the multitude of ways to
manufacture artificial student test score gains.
Otherwise, manufactured student achievement scores
and tweaked accountability tests may ultimately help
states meet the 100 percent proficiency target written
into NCLB but will likely do little to support or advance
genuine student learning. 
These methods of gaming the system need to be con-
sidered when differentiating between true and falsified
levels of increased student learning and achievement.
And when interpreting trend line, longitudinal data con-
sumers need to be aware that many extraneous, uncon-
trollable variables might help explain gains or “illusions
of progress,” when true gains in student learning cannot
7
The Unintended, Pernicious Consequences of "Staying the Course" on the United States' No Child Left Behind Policy
be illustrated alone. This was exemplified in this case.
There was much occurring behind the scenes that helped
explain student achievement in Arizona.
And even though gains in levels of student achieve-
ment cannot be explained solely as effects of gaming the
system, such gains should not be attributed solely to
policies and practices meant to hold students account-
able for meeting higher standards. At the very least, we
might agree that some proportion of the claimed success-
es of the testing provisions of NCLB are artificial as man-
ufactured by teachers, administrators, and local and state
education leaders who today, as foreshadowed in the case
of the Texas Miracle, are continuing to work the system
to survive. 
Glimpse of a Silver Lining
In spite of the many unintended, negative consequences
resulting from confusing testing, with more effective
teaching, the standards-based reform movement driven
by NCLB may have promoted a few forms of education-
al improvement. In cost-benefit terms, however, the few
benefits have occurred at a cost—and a significant mon-
etary cost considering the billions of dollars spent pur-
chasing standardized tests and their accompanying test
preparation materials (profits for which have increased
exponentially since the enactment of NCLB). Ironically,
test developers are also gaming the system, but to their
advantage.
Perhaps the largest benefit associated with high-
stakes testing policies is that states have revisited,
revised, and raised their standards to meet what profes-
sional teacher organizations (e.g., the National Council
of Teachers of Mathematics) regard as essential subject
matter knowledge. Because teachers are being held
accountable for teaching the content included in these
standards, the result has been more consistency across
subjects and better uniformity across classrooms,
schools, and even state borders. However, not everyone
in the education profession agrees this is a benefit. Along
with an increase in standardization and uniformity has
come a decrease in professional autonomy for teachers,
administrators, and local state school personnel. 
Another benefit of implementing high-stakes testing
policies is that more monies are being targeted toward
some children most in need of help. Remediation pro-
grams have been developed to help students who fail
high-stakes tests learn the material necessary to pass each
test. Although teaching children how to pass high-stakes
tests is of questionable utility and principle, these efforts
are being targeted toward students who, it is assumed,
went without such remediation efforts before NCLB. 
A final benefit of nearly universal high-stakes testing
may be that test scores can be used for diagnostic pur-
poses, helping teachers better understand child learning
problems and design individualized instruction.
However, in most states, high-stakes tests are adminis-
tered in the spring and the test results are returned dur-
ing the summer, after school is out. Children have exited
last year’s classrooms to start a new school year in the fall
with a new teacher. To date, the diagnostic benefits of
implementing high-stakes tests have gone unrealized
and, ironically, may only be attained as greater numbers
of children are held back in grade level, which is a polit-
ically unacceptable option. 
Concluding Remarks
When rational people are faced with impossible
demands, they will work every angle they can to adapt,
survive, and possibly prosper. Rational people are engag-
ing in irrational, unethical, and unprofessional practices
as they attempt to dodge the negative or realize the pos-
itive consequences increasingly tied to student perform-
ance on tests. Many educators faced with the stronger
accountability provisions written into NCLB are working
every angle to meet the letter of the law, and ironically,
through their practices, are working against the well-
intentioned theory on which the law is based. Although
there are educators who, despite the temptation to game
the system, are following the law in ethical and profes-
sionally defensible ways, this paper described the lengths
to which many educators at local and state levels have
gone to ensure that students do well on high-stakes tests
when focusing on student learning isn’t enough. The
hands of these good-hearted public educators are tied by
a misguided federal law, and bad things are happening. 
If federal lawmakers’ continue to believe that the
more educators and students are held accountable and
the more stringent the consequences, the more student
test scores will increase but student learning won’t. As
long as methods of gaming the system persist, never will
we be able to determine precisely what students gen-
uinely learn under NCLB. But with serious consequences
attached to performance, it is unlikely methods of gam-
ing the system might ever be eliminated or controlled.
Other tactics might simply emerge, again, to counter the
high-stakes, high-stress environment now encapsulating
student learning in America’s public schools. 
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The only way to control these players is to close the
loopholes perpetuating such gaming. With the reautho-
rization of NCLB forthcoming, ways educators are gam-
ing NCLB might be understood and used to inform sig-
nificant changes in the future version of this law.
Or, it might be preferable to eliminate the practices
causing such gaming altogether: The stronger accounta-
bility tenet at issue here might be discarded. Nichols and
Berliner (2008) detail why they believe high-stakes tests
have so easily slipped into contemporary American life.
They argue that (1) it makes sense to the general public
to apply basic business principles to education in terms
of monitoring inputs and, more importantly, outputs; (2)
in order to maintain global competitiveness, students
must be held accountable for meeting even higher stan-
dards; (3) this type of sorting mechanism helps preserve
social status by effectively differentiating the most from
the least capable, as measured by standardized tests; (4)
the parent(s) of the students least effected by high-stakes
testing are least concerned yet the most able to take
action against it; and (5) the competition-seeking public
intrinsically “likes” high-stakes testing. By educating the
general public about how high-stakes tests have contam-
inated student learning in America’s public schools and
by helping them put the above assumptions “in check”
and collectively question whether what seems like com-
monsense indeed works in the ways theorized, the
stronger accountability tenet of NCLB  might very well
be abandoned versus reauthorized altogether.
In Machiavelli’s later work, Discourses on Livy, he
promotes republicanism—the governing of a nation
through liberty, civic virtuosity, and popular consent and
control. Machiavelli valued liberty most during times of
oppression and, in his later years, was more interested in
promoting just and noble ends for the popular good.
Perhaps the nation might follow a similar trajectory with
the reauthorization of the stronger accountability tenet of
NCLB nearing. Perhaps the people, tired or fed up with
the uniform, oppressive nature of this tenet of the law,
may very well become more interested in promoting just
and noble ends for the popular good; that is, promoting
quality education and bringing back to public schooling
the liberty and civic virtuosity it deserves and on which
it thrives. 
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The jump in scores from 2004 to 2005 occurred when the former AIMS tests were revised and the AIMS Dual
Purpose Assessments (DPAs) were first administered. The revised tests were “the first to be aligned with the state
standards” but were arguably easier than previous forms of the AIMS (see also Stotsky, 1998). New cut scores for
the tests were also established (Arizona Department of Education, 2005).
The 2000 AIMS high school exit exam (grade
10) math scores are not listed because the
assessment did not focus on core mathematics
skills nor was it comparable to the content of
the previous AIMS assessments (Arizona
Department of Education Standards and
Assessment Division, 2002).
The high school class of 2006 first took the AIMS as sophomores
in 2004. Thirty-nine percent of the students who took the AIMS
math test passed on their first attempt. In 2005, the test was
changed. When the class of 2007 first took the AIMS as sopho-
mores, 69 percent passed on their first attempt. Thirty percent
more sophomores passed the AIMS math exit exam from 2004 to
2005.
